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A PRAGMATIST’S VIEW OF PROMISSORY LAW 
WITH A FOCUS ON CONSENT AND RELIANCE 
ROBERT A. HILLMAN? 
ABSTRACT 
 This Article discusses Professor Nate Oman’s excellent new 
book, The Dignity of Commerce, which makes an impressive case 
for how markets can produce “desirable” outcomes for society. In 
addition to a comprehensive account of what he calls “virtues” of 
markets, such as their tendency to produce cooperation, trust, and 
wealth, the book is full of useful and persuasive supporting infor-
mation and discussions. 
 Oman is not only a fan of markets, but he asserts that mar-
kets are the “center” of contract theory, and provide its normative 
foundation. Elaborating, Oman concludes that “contract law exists 
primarily to support markets” and that “contracts are valuable be-
cause they facilitate commerce and extend the reach of markets. It is 
their beneficial consequences that justify the enforcement of contracts.” 
 This Article focuses on two of the many important issues 
generated by Oman’s thesis. First, has Oman done enough to con-
vince that markets are what he calls the “centerpiece” of contract 
law? Second, does his effort to present what is essentially a unitary 
normative theory of contract handcuff his analysis of particular 
contract issues and doctrines? I will argue that markets are im-
portant and contract law should and does play an important role 
in supporting markets. However, we should not demote other visions 
of contract law, but see them all as important ingredients in un-
derstanding the subject. By largely espousing a unitary, integra-
tive theory of contract law, Oman’s thesis leads to a few debatable 
propositions, including with respect to consent to boilerplate and 
reliance on promises, which the Article takes up in some detail. 
The Article concludes that The Dignity of Commerce makes 
a solid case for the importance and virtues of markets and is rich in 
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discussion and detail. As with any excellent work, it makes the reader 
ponder accepted wisdom and adds to the reader’s perspective. Fur-
ther, in making his case for markets, Oman does an excellent job 
of introducing, discussing, and debunking many counterarguments. 
My effort in this Article is only to reflect on whether the market 
argument can capture the entire contract law field. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 “Contract law is multidimensional.”1 By this, I mean that 
no unitary theory can fully explain contract law. Instead, contract 
law is comprised of many theories, including promise, reliance, 
consent, formalist, contextual, critical, economic, and relational 
theories.2 I believe we should be wary of unified theories that pur-
port to account for the entire subject, despite the false appeal of 
theory to clarify and tame a subject. Instead, in my view, the only 
persuasive theory is that “contract law is a plausible, if not perfect, 
reflection of various normative choices of the surrounding society.”3 
 Nathan Oman’s excellent new book, The Dignity of Com-
merce, makes an impressive case for how markets can produce 
“desirable” outcomes for society.4 In addition to a comprehensive 
account of what he calls “virtues” of markets, such as their ten-
dency to produce cooperation, trust, and wealth, the book is full 
of useful and persuasive supporting information and discussions.5 
Oman is indeed an erudite analyst and, in the process of making 
his case for markets, the book is rich in additional references.6 
Further, Oman is not reluctant to challenge analysts with differ-
ent perspectives than his own, while at the same time shedding 
light on their theses.7 
                                                                                                                        
1 ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW 268 (1997). 
2 See id. at 12–18 (promise theory); id. at 24–26 (reliance theory); id. at 35–36 
(consent theory); id. at 168 (formalist and contextualist theories); id. at 173 
(critical theory); id. at 213 (economic theories); id. at 256 (relational theory). 
3 Id. at 274. Of course, I am not alone in holding a pragmatic view of the 
law. See, e.g., Scott Hershovitz, The Search for a Grand Unified Theory of Tort Law, 
130 HARV. L. REV. 942, 968 (2017) (book review) (“The problem is that Ripstein 
thinks there’s something lurking beneath the surface that explains all of tort .... 
But ... Ripstein’s story is too simple to make sense of the doctrine.”). 
4 See generally NATHAN B. OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE (2017) [here-
inafter DIGNITY]. 
5 I found especially helpful the book’s comparison of consent in democratic 
institutions and in the context of boilerplate contracts. Id. at 141–46. 
6 For example, Oman invokes, among others, The Merchant of Venice, id. at 
1–8; English legal history, id. at 5–6; Spartacus, id. at 36; The Iliad, id. at 37; 
Hayek, id. at 38; Aristotle, id. at 40–41; Adam Smith, id. at 43; Montesquieu, 
id.; Dworkin, id. at 51; Rawls, id.; and even Gordon Gecko (from the movie 
“Wall Street”), id. at 42.  
7 See, e.g., discussions of the works of Kennedy, id. at 33–34; Sunstein, id. 
at 34–35; Dworkin, id. at 62–63; Fried, id. at 76–77; Radin, id. at 138–39; 
Rakoff, id. at 155 n.99; Barnett, id. at 155–56; and Leff, id. at 157.  
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 An additional strength of The Dignity of Commerce is that 
Oman is not a dogmatic advocate of his position. He sensibly rec-
ognizes the darker side of markets: “[O]ne cannot deny that markets 
can lead to morally monstrous results.”8 Oman insists that his 
claim is “modest” that “certain kinds of well-functioning markets 
are sufficiently desirable to be a fit object of the law’s concern”9 and 
that “markets can sometimes be bad.”10 In a chapter on boilerplate 
largely advocating a diminished role for the principle of consent, 
he admits that “consent is not irrelevant[,]”11 and usefully discusses 
its various contributions.12 
 Still, Oman writes that markets are the key to an inte-
grated solution to some of the great contract law issues and he goes 
pretty far in placing markets as the core and foundation of contract 
law at the expense of other theories.13 In testing his theory, I will 
focus on the role of consent in boilerplate cases and the function 
of reliance in the enforcement of promises to show that in my view 
much more is at work than Oman’s “market argument.”14 First, in 
                                                                                                                        
8 DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 18. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 31. 
11 Id. at 156. 
12 See, e.g., id. at 145–47. 
13 Commerce, according to Oman, “rightly constitutes the core of contractual 
liability.” Id. at 110. Further, he writes that “contract law exists to support markets.” 
Id. at 166. Oman’s thesis is somewhat surprising in that previously he did not 
seem to be a great fan of unitary theories of contract or at least recognized the com-
plexity of the field. In reviewing Stephen Smith’s Contract Theory, Oman writes, 
“[C]ompeting disciplinary approaches have been energetically proselytizing for 
their chosen theories. Hence, modern legal scholarship abounds with economic, 
philosophical, and sociological theories of contract law.” Nathan Oman, Unity and 
Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1483 (2005) (reviewing 
STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY (2004)). Further, “in [Smith’s] drive to 
ground contract law in a single normative principle, he comes to the startling 
conclusion that many of what we think of as the core rules of the subject—such 
as those governing breach and damages—are not actually part of contract law 
at all.” Id. at 1485. Ultimately, however, Oman’s resolution of the debate be-
tween pragmatists and unitary theorists is to argue that “theorists should turn 
their attention toward providing a principled way of integrating competing ap-
proaches to contract in a single theory,” notwithstanding his admonition to 
abandon “trying to unite all of contract law under a single normative principle.” 
Id. It seems Oman wants to end up with a “single theory,” albeit one that “in-
tegrates” the multiple dimensions of contract law. Id. at 1485, 1506. 
14 Oman uses this phrase throughout the book. DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 
15–17, 125, 181. 
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Part I, I will briefly describe Oman’s thesis and raise some concerns. 
Then I will discuss two issues in Part II. First, has Oman done 
enough to convince that markets are what he calls the “centerpiece” 
of contract law? Second, does his effort to present what is essen-
tially a unitary, integrative theory of contract handcuff his anal-
ysis of particular contract issues and doctrines? I will argue that 
markets are important and contract law should and does play an 
important role in supporting markets. However, we should not de-
mote other visions of contract law, but see them all as important 
ingredients in understanding the subject. By largely espousing a 
unitary, integrative theory of contract law,15 Oman boxes himself 
into a corner that leads to some debatable propositions, including 
with respect to consent to boilerplate and reliance on promises. 
I. THE THESIS OF THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE 
 Oman comes right to the point on the first page of The Dignity 
of Commerce: “[W]ell-functioning markets are morally desirable,” 
so contract law should support them.16 In filling out his vision, he 
urges that markets are a “social practice [that] produce[s] certain 
outcomes that we should regard as morally desirable.”17 Not only 
do markets increase wealth, but they also engender “peaceful co-
operation in a pluralistic society and inculcate certain moral vir-
tues in market participants,”18 including cooperation and trust.19 
Thus, markets “flatten social hierarchies”20 because “[l]iberal pol-
itics alone cannot provide a sufficient framework of cooperation 
for a society with deep moral disagreements.”21 Further, Oman seeks 
to refute those pessimistic about the influence of markets, such as 
those who fear that commodification and adhesion are the end-result 
of markets.22 
 Partly in response to the latter concern, Oman isolates the 
conditions necessary for markets to succeed, including that they 
                                                                                                                        
15 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
16 DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 1. 
17 Id. at 15. 
18 Id. at 16. 
19 Id. at 101. 
20 Id. at 46. 
21 Id. at 54. 
22 Id. at 170–75. 
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must be “well-functioning”23 and not “pernicious.”24 However, these 
terms challenge definition. For example, for Oman, well-function-
ing markets “are defined by conditions necessary to deliver a par-
ticular set of moral goods: cooperation, certain virtues, and wealth.”25 
Pernicious markets, on the other hand, harm their participants, 
or “involve the injection of mercantile values in contexts and prac-
tices where those values are destructive,” or involve a trade of 
goods or action “whose character is changed ... resulting in a loss 
of ... value.”26 Oman follows with some examples, but faces a chal-
lenge in defining boundaries between markets that are harmful 
or destructive and those that deliver the moral goods. Without a 
more systematic strategy for comparing the benefits of and harm 
caused by a given market, how is the reader to be convinced that 
markets are not “morally unresolvable”27 and that the net result 
of a given market is beneficial to society?28 
 Oman is not only a fan of markets, but he asserts that mar-
kets are the “center” of contract theory,29 and provide its normative 
foundation.30 Elaborating, Oman concludes that “contract law exists 
primarily to support markets”31 and that “contracts are valuable 
because they facilitate commerce and extend the reach of markets. 
It is their beneficial consequences that justify the enforcement of 
contracts.”32 With this framework, Oman seeks to resolve some 
controversial contract law issues.33 Among these, Oman writes that 
                                                                                                                        
23 Id. at 63. 
24 Id. at 160. 
25 Id. at 162. 
26 Id. at 166–67. 
27 Robert D. Kaplan, Why Trump Can’t Disengage From the World, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/06/opinion/sunday/why 
-trump-cant-disengage-america-from-the-world.html. 
28 Of course, this problem is not unique to Oman’s market argument. Con-
sider the principle of manifest destiny. By the United States’ allegiance to the 
principle, the country gained vast resources necessary to defeat our Axis foes 
in World War II. Id. On the other hand, “because settling that continent involved 
slavery and genocide against the indigenous inhabitants, American history is 
morally unresolvable.” Id. 
29 DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 13. 
30 Id. at 15. 
31 Id. at 38; see also id. at 90. 
32 Id. at 143. 
33 See infra Part II. 
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contract law should enforce contracts of adhesion,34 that “consent 
does not justify the enforcement of [boilerplate] contracts,”35 and 
that reliance on promises plays no role in their enforcement.36 
Part II of this Essay focuses on Oman’s take on these issues. 
II.  OMAN’S RECIPE FOR CONTRACT LAW, WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS 
ON CONSENT TO BOILERPLATE AND RELIANCE ON PROMISES 
 Part II of The Dignity of Commerce describes the “basic struc-
ture for a market-sustaining law of contracts.”37 Oman’s market 
orientation leads to some conclusions about contract law that will 
be controversial to some readers. I focus on consent to boilerplate 
and reliance on promises. 
A. Consent to Boilerplate 
 Oman makes an excellent argument in favor of the importance 
of consent. For example, he posits that a consent requirement serves 
a coordination function, ensuring that the parties agree to the 
same terms, but at the same time allowing “transactional flexibility 
and experimentation.”38 Consent also curbs abuse by providing a 
constraint on the drafter.39 
 Nevertheless, Oman asserts that the focus on consent in 
boilerplate cases is “attenuated” and “misplaced.”40 Contract law 
enforces boilerplate because “doing so strengthens and extends mar-
kets.”41 Further, in boilerplate circumstances, “the moral value of 
markets and commerce ... justifies contractual enforcement.”42 Oman 
demotes consent to serving “subordinate functions” only.43 In fact, 
according to Oman, boilerplate requires only a “bare minimum of 
                                                                                                                        
34 DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 17. 
35 Id. at 134. 
36 Id. at 107. 
37 Id. at 39. 
38 Id. at 142; see also id. at 145 (“stating we give effect only to terms agreed 
to by both parties.”). 
39 Id. at 146. 
40 Id. at 134. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
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consent”44 and “need not be particularly well informed,”45 so the 
“search for meaningful consent should be abandoned.”46 Instead, 
Oman relies on “the social context on which boilerplate is written” 
to find what he calls “feedback mechanisms” that limit the possi-
bility of abuse,47 such as competition and reputational sanctions.48 
 To reach these conclusions, Oman relies in part on economic 
theory, reinforced by an anecdote about his positive experience with 
his Kindle.49 As to the former, certainly non-legal forces, such as 
price competition and reputation, mitigate what he calls “the pa-
rade of horribles” that surface too often in the writings of market 
critics.50 As to the latter, many of us can also share stories about 
good experiences with vendors and manufacturers. Although crit-
ics of markets may overstate their case, unfortunately there is 
also plenty of evidence of overreaching to suggest caution about 
whether market forces should allay concerns about boilerplate.51 
Take, for example, the profusion of “dangerous” terms in software 
end-user license agreements.52 Terms that allow software ven-
dors to invade our privacy, that authorize automatic renewal and 
unilateral modification, that call for arbitration in distant venues 
and deny class actions, or that disclaim all liability notwithstand-
ing representations on vendors’ websites that would constitute 
express warranties, are just a few reasons for concern.53 So I am 
                                                                                                                        
44 Id. at 135; see also id. at 153. 
45 Id. at 156. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 148. 
48 Id. at 150–53. 
49 Id. at 141–53. 
50 Id. at 141; see id. at 151–53 (discussing non-legal forces). Oman asserts 
that “[i]n a competitive market, economic theory suggests that prices will be 
driven down to marginal cost. If boilerplate reduces costs to firms, any result-
ing rents should ultimately be dissipated as price reductions to consumers.” Id. 
at 151. But he admits there is little empirical evidence to substantiate this 
claim. Id. 
51 See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Ibrahim Barakat, Warranties and Disclaimers 
in the Electronic Age, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 6–7, 9–10, 15–16 (2009) (noting 
that vendors disclaim liability in their end-user license agreements after making 
express warranties on their websites). 
52 See Annalee Newitz, Dangerous Terms: A User’s Guide to EULAs, ELEC. FRON-
TIER FOUND. (Feb. 2005), http://www.eff.org/wp/dangerous-terms-users-guide-eulas 
[https://perma.cc/FU9E-Y374]. 
53 See id.; DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 134. 
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not persuaded by Oman’s argument that contract law should take 
a “permissive stance toward the enforcement of boilerplate.”54 
 Notwithstanding my concern, Oman’s perspective on consent 
seems closest to Llewellyn’s “blanket assent” theory of boilerplate,55 
in which consumers understand that they will be bound to rea-
sonable terms they do not bother to read,56 for which I have a lot 
of sympathy.57 But blanket assent requires a reasonable presen-
tation of non-egregious terms.58 And blanket assent probably comes 
closest to the reality of what people are thinking when they sign 
or click “I agree” to boilerplate.59 So I would argue that Llewellyn’s 
conception of consent is more than a “bare minimum of consent.”60 
 Oman worries that the focus on the threshold of “meaning-
fulness of consent,” such as my observation about blanket assent, 
creates ambiguity and is ultimately unhelpful.61 But any assessment 
of whether “feedback mechanisms”62 are working successfully, 
and whether a market is “well-functioning,” are also problematic.63 
Consider again the Internet software market’s profusion of “dan-
gerous terms.”64 Oman relies in part on whether such a market 
causes “harm,”65 but he admits that he has no “particular theory 
of harm to offer.”66 
                                                                                                                        
54 DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 158. 
55 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 
370 (1960) (asserting that there is no “specific assent” to boilerplate clauses, 
but rather the consumer assents generally to “any not unreasonable or inde-
cent terms ... which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the 
dickered terms. The fine print which has not been read has no business to cut 
under the reasonable meaning of those dickered terms” that make up the dom-
inant agreement.). 
56 See LLEWELLYN, supra note 55, at 370–71. 
57 See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Con-
tracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 461–63 (2002). 
58 See id. 
59 Arthur Leff made a similar argument years ago. See Arthur Leff, Contract 
as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 152–53 (1970). 
60 DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 135. 
61 Id. at 156–58. 
62 Id. at 148. 
63 See id. at 19, 135; supra text accompanying notes 23–27 (asserting that 
lack of a systematic strategy to compare a market’s benefits to its harms can create 
the view that markets are “morally unresolvable”). 
64 Newitz, supra note 52. 
65 DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 166–67. 
66 Id. at 167. 
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 Oman concludes the boilerplate discussion by noting that his 
market argument is not primarily about autonomy, and therefore 
the argument “provides no principled objection per se to regulat-
ing contracts based on their content.”67 I agree that enforcement 
of boilerplate may ultimately come down to policing the substance of 
terms. For me, this only introduces more theories, principles, and 
values into the mix of boilerplate enforcement, such as fairness, 
corrective justice, and morality. Ultimately, then, I am not sure 
why the market argument trumps consent, or for that matter, other 
principles. Why the need to find a key element? 
B.  Reliance on Promises 
 Oman presents what he believes the law of promise en-
forcement should be in order to facilitate markets. He writes that 
“all promises made in furtherance of commercial activity within a 
market should be presumptively enforceable, regardless of whether” 
the promise is supported by consideration or relied on, and promises 
outside of markets that are part of a bargain should also be en-
forced.68 To support this perspective, Oman in part must convince 
the reader that reliance on promises is not important, notwith-
standing that reliance is a key element of promissory estoppel as 
pronounced in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, as well as 
in a multitude of cases.69 
 Prior to the mid-1980s, courts and analysts assumed that 
reliance was the core of promissory estoppel.70 But an article by 
Farber and Matheson upset the applecart.71 The article concluded 
that “reliance is no longer the key to promissory estoppel.”72 The 
authors asserted that courts enforce promises if the promisor made 
a “credible” promise, and the promisor would benefit “from economic 
                                                                                                                        
67 Id. at 158–59. 
68 Id. at 90; see id. at 100. 
69 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
70 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Es-
toppel: Contract Law and the “Invisible Handshake,” 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 
909–10 (1985). 
71 See id. at 903–04. 
72 Id. at 904. Oman refers to “a number of extensive studies” that claim that 
courts enforce promises in commercial settings without reliance. See DIGNITY, 
supra note 4, at 106 (citing Farber & Matheson, supra note 70, at 907 n.16; Randy 
E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract 
Formalities, and Misrepresentation, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443, 455–68 (1987)). 
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activity.”73 Reliance might be invoked in the cases, Farber and 
Matheson believed, but courts paid only lip service to it in their 
decisions.74 Analysts began treating Farber and Matheson’s work 
as a “new consensus” that plaintiffs can succeed in promissory es-
toppel cases without demonstrating their reliance on a promise.75 
 Apparently influenced by this work, Oman writes that “courts 
are finding promissory estoppel in the absence of clear evidence of 
reliance provided that the promises occur in a commercial context 
where we can infer that the parties intended to be legally bound.”76 
Oman, therefore, concludes that “reliance does no work in picking 
out which promises should be enforced.”77 This conclusion reinforces 
Oman’s thesis that the benefits of commercial activity in markets 
is the reason that the law enforces promises, not reliance.78 
 But, as a descriptive matter, are Farber and Matheson, and 
now Oman, correct that reliance is unimportant in promissory es-
toppel cases? There is considerable contrary evidence. For example, 
my study of all promissory estoppel cases from 1994 through 1996 
concluded that reliance was a necessary requisite to recovery.79 
In 93 percent of the cases that were successful on the merits, courts 
not only discussed the reliance element but, “specifically looked 
for and found reliance in ... the case.”80 I wrote: 
Not only did the courts look for reliance in successful cases, the 
reliance they found was concrete and real. Typical cases included a 
general contractor making a bid for a renovation job in reliance 
on a subcontractor’s bid to install the roof, a company spending 
more than $75,000 to erect a sign in reliance on a state’s approval 
of the location, and a stockbroker purchasing bonds for resale 
in reliance on an investor’s promise to buy the bonds.81 
                                                                                                                        
73 See Farber & Matheson, supra note 70, at 914. See also Edward Yorio & 
Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111, 133 (1991). 
74 See Farber & Matheson, supra note 70, at 904. 
75 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 
522 (1996); James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 547, 569 (1995). 
76 DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 106. 
77 Id. at 107. 
78 According to Oman, reliance “is not a theory of contract at all.” Id. 
79 See Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the “New Consensus” on Promissory Es-
toppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 600–01 (1998). 
80 Id. at 597. 
81 Id. at 603 (discussing Branco Enters. v. Delta Roofing, 886 S.W.2d 157, 
158 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 897 F. 
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Further, reliance was a focus “across variations in subject matter, 
the size and nature of the litigants, and the court rendering the judg-
ment.”82 Finally, I found that “[t]he promise theorists’ assertion of 
the relative unimportance of reliance seemed much less persuasive 
after reviewing the cases and arguments used to support it.”83 
 A much less systematic effort to look at some recent prom-
issory estoppel cases suggests that reliance still plays a crucial 
role in the cases.84 Typical language in the opinions reinforces this 
claim: “Detrimental reliance is an indispensable element of a prom-
issory estoppel claim ... and a failure to adequately plead that el-
ement requires dismissal.”85 “The vital principle is that who by 
his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not 
otherwise have done shall not subject such person to loss or injury 
by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted.”86 
 A typical successful case on the pleadings, is irth Solutions, 
LLC v. Windstream Communications, LLC, where plaintiff, a soft-
ware provider, continued to provide services to defendant subscriber 
after its subscription ended.87 At the time, the defendant owed over 
                                                                                                                        
Supp. 142, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); and Pilot Oil Corp. v. Ohio Dep’t of Transp., 
656 N.E.2d 1379, 1382–83 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995)). 
82 Id. at 583. 
83 Id. at 618. 
84 I asked a research assistant to enter “promissory estoppel” as the search 
term on Westlaw and to report on sixty or so of the most recent cases. My assistant 
recorded (1) the name of the case and citation; (2) the holding; (3) whether the 
decision was based on a motion (e.g., summary judgment or on the pleadings) or 
on the merits after trial; (4) the reason for the decision (focusing on the prom-
issory estoppel cause of action); (5) where applicable, whether the court granted 
reliance or expectancy damages; and paramount for purposes here; (6) what 
the court has to say about reliance as an important factor. I then looked at the 
first sixty or so cases that popped up. I focus on issue (6) here. 
85 Schroeder v. Pinterest, Inc., 17 N.Y.S.3d 678, 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) 
(“The complaint merely states, in conclusory fashion, that plaintiffs ‘reasonably 
relied on Cohen’s promise,’ but does not explain how they purportedly relied. 
Indeed, there are no facts pleaded showing that plaintiffs did something, or re-
frained from doing something, in reliance on Cohen’s email.”). 
86 Faulks v. Wells Fargo & Co., 231 F. Supp. 3d 387, 404 (N.D. Cal. 2017) 
(quoting Garcia v. World Sav., FSB, 183 Cal. App. 4th 1031, 1041–43 (2010)). And 
further, “logically, injury is required; without injury there would be no injustice 
in not enforcing the promise.” Oliveira v. Sugarman, 152 A.3d 728, 746 (Md. 
2017) (quoting JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 6.1 (7th ed. 2014)). 
87 irth Sols., LLC v. Windstream Commc’ns, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-219, 2017 WL 
367146, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 25, 2017). Courts decide many of such cases at 
the pleading stage. 
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$97,000 on the subscription.88 While the parties were negotiating 
a new deal, defendant promised to pay for additional services.89 
The court stated: 
The complaint ... makes sufficient factual allegations to sup-
port the plausibility of plaintiff’s reliance being reasonable. De-
fendant had been a client of plaintiff’s since 2007. Wanting to 
retain its client’s business and to recover as much of the past 
due overages as readily as it could, plaintiff made the good faith 
gesture of continuing to provide service to defendant on defen-
dant’s promise that it would pay for the continuation of service. 
Plaintiff did so for one month, a period of time that the court 
views, again at the pleading stage, as reasonable in light of the 
allegations that the parties were attempting to negotiate a new 
deal during that period. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dis-
miss the promissory estoppel claim is denied.90 
 In cases where the plaintiff did not succeed, either on the 
merits or on the pleadings, the lack of reasonable reliance was at 
least one of the reasons?except where the court did not find an 
actionable promise, which, of course, short-circuits the need for a 
discussion of reliance91?or where the court found that the actionable 
                                                                                                                        
88 Id. at *3. 
89 Id. 
90 Id.; see also State ex rel. Kingry v. Landmarc Cap. & Inv. Co., No. 1 CA-
CV 14-0022, 2016 WL 7477720, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2016) (discussing 
whether reliance was reasonable); Boswell v. City of Chi., 69 N.E.3d 379, 385 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2016) (noting that plaintiff reasonably relied on city’s promise of employ-
ment by leaving his previous employment and moving with his family to Chi-
cago); Salatino v. Salatino, 786 N.Y.S.2d 570, 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (noting 
that plaintiff’s father promised to convey certain interests in real property to his 
daughter; complaint sufficient because of the allegation that the plaintiff “in-
vested time and money managing and maintaining both properties.”); Guidry v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. H-16-2618, 2017 WL 58845, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 
2017) (“[d]efendant does not cite any authority for the proposition that forego-
ing action to prevent foreclosure is not sufficient for detrimental reliance.”). 
91 See, e.g., Class Racing Stable, LLC v. Breeders’ Cup Ltd., No. 5:16-200-
KKC, 2017 WL 562175, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 10, 2017) (holding reliance was 
not reasonable); see also Condor Funding, LLC v. 176 Broadway Owners Corp., 
46 N.Y.S.3d 99, 101 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (“defendant did not establish that plaintiff 
clearly and unambiguously promised to terminate the agreement.”); Bolender 
v. Ronin Prop. Partners, LLC, 49 Misc.3d 1218(A), at *15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) 
(holding that promissory estoppel did not apply because the promise was not 
“clear and unequivocal”); Hester v. Case W. Res. Univ., 80 N.E.3d 1186, 1199 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (finding that the university did not promise plaintiff to re-
serve her previous job for her). 
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contract claim displaced the promissory estoppel claim.92 A typical 
unsuccessful case was Ferreyr v. Soros, where plaintiff’s claim that 
defendant promised to purchase a condominium failed on the plead-
ings because the alleged facts did not demonstrate an “unconsciona-
ble injury” to the plaintiff in reliance on defendant’s promise.93 
 As with Oman’s discussion of boilerplate consent, I think 
his focus on markets leads to a conclusion he need not reach. In-
stead of asserting that the market theory displaces reliance, why 
not conclude that markets and reliance share the load in promis-
sory law, along with still other elements? 
CONCLUSION 
 I loved reading The Dignity of Commerce. It makes a solid 
case for the importance and virtues of markets and is rich in dis-
cussion and detail. As with any excellent book, it makes the reader 
ponder accepted wisdom and adds to the reader’s perspective. Fur-
ther, in making his case for markets, Oman does an excellent job 
of introducing, discussing, and debunking many counterarguments. 
My effort here is only to reflect on whether the market argument 
really can capture the entire contract law field. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                        
92 See, e.g., JJM Sunrise Auto., LLC v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 997 
N.Y.S.2d 270, 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 1, 2015); see also Inspired Dev. Grp., LLC 
v. Inspired Prod. Grp., LLC, No. 9:16-CV-80076-ROSENBERG/BRANNON, 
2017 WL 411997, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2017); Lawson v. Ass’n of Apartment 
Owners, No. 15-00449 DKW-KSC, 2016 WL 749361, *9–10 (D. Haw. Dec. 30, 
2016) (holding that a valid contract claim displaces promissory estoppel). 
93 Ferreyr v. Soros, 984 N.Y.S.2d 296, 297 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014); see also 
Landan v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Bus. Trust, 2016 WL 5253329 (W.D. Pa. 2016) 
(landowner’s reliance on alleged promises of prospective lessee to sign a lease 
was unreasonable in light of the express language of the letter of intent). 
